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INTRODUCTION
A cornerstone of financial reporting by public companies is the
requirement that their annual financial statements be audited by
independent outside auditors. As a result of the rising tide of financial
misstatements by public companies, however, there have been serious
concerns as to whether outside auditors adequately carried out their
responsibilities and, in particular, whether their independence was
compromised. The resulting Sarbanes-Oxley Act attempts to provide
regulatory reform to the accounting industry.' The reform includes the
creation of an accounting oversight board and restrictions on an outside
auditor of a public company from providing the same company with
certain consulting services.
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1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
[hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
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Professional and regulatory requirements of independence,
however, are not effective when outside auditors are seduced by large
fees. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act seeks to restrict consulting fees,
a cause for the breakdown of independence, and further regulate the
accounting industry, the Act leaves untouched several fundamental facts
regarding an outside auditor. First, an outside auditor can never truly be
independent since they are paid and selected by the same corporations
that are being audited. Second, and related to the first fact, an outside
auditor is only financially motivated to do what is minimally required,
based on Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS")2 , in
auditing the financial statements of a company. As a result, an outside
auditor has little financial incentive to take innovative or comprehensive
steps, such as forensic procedures, to ensure that a company's books are
accurate. This Article reviews recent SEC enforcement actions and
other civil litigation against outside auditors regarding corporate
financial misstatements. The review shows that despite a vigorous
enforcement effort, it is difficult to deter audit firms from violating, in
repeated and systemic fashion, the federal securities laws and
professional standards, including rules requiring independence by
auditors. The review of these cases shows that lucrative fees almost
always played a role in the violations. This Article also reviews various
behavioral research studies showing that company-hired auditors' strong
and subconscious bias in favor of their employers greatly dilutes the
effectiveness of deterrence.
This Article explores whether there can be an alternative to the
current system of relying on independent outside auditors retained by
corporations themselves to audit corporate financial statements. One
alternative is to take advantage of the fact that there are outside parties,
such as institutional investors, that have a strong financial interest in
determining the accurate financial condition of public companies.
Specifically, this Article proposes a system in which institutional
investors and other outside parties would retain accounting or other
financial professionals ("investor-hired auditors") to audit or otherwise
review the financial data of the public companies. The financial interest
2. See SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-23 n.17 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (noting that GAAS are "standards prescribed by the Auditing Standards Board of
the [American Institute of Certified Public Accountants] for the conduct of auditors in
the performance of an examination").
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of these investor-hired auditors will be aligned with the financial
interests of the investors. They will be financially motivated not to do
the minimum, but to do their utmost, including finding innovative steps,
to determine the most accurate picture of a public company's financial
condition. As a result, the quality of financial data will also improve.
Such a system, however, is not possible today because the public,
and any investor-hired auditor, unlike auditors retained by public
companies, do not have access to public companies' raw financial data
to perform any meaningful analysis. In addition, compared to auditors
hired by the companies, the public does not have the same level of
access to management to question or have discussions regarding the
companies' financial condition. Thus, a system in which it will be
feasible for outside parties to retain financial professionals meaningfully
to review and analyze public companies must enable such professionals
to have:
* access to public companies' raw financial data; and
* access to management to discuss specific accounting
questions or issues.
Advances in Internet technology make such access feasible. This
Article proposes that public companies be required to provide public
access to its raw financial data by maintaining its financial records on
the Internet on a real time basis. It also proposes that public companies
be required to respond, in a limited fashion, to written questions posted
on the Internet by the public regarding its financial data. If outside
parties, such as institutional investors, can use their own accountants or
financial experts to audit or analyze a company's financial data, there
will be less of a need for company- hired auditors to be independent. It
may then be reasonable to relax the restrictions on company-hired
auditors' ability to provide consulting services, as currently mandated
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Under this proposal, the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") will play a central role in establishing
requirements for such access and to prevent abuse or frivolous use of
such access. In addition, legislation will also be necessary to ameliorate
possible risks and harms from such public access. In particular, it will
be necessary to create legal safe harbors to decrease the litigation risk
that may accompany what will effectively be additional disclosure of
material information to the public.
Thus, rather then creating further regulations to force company-
hired auditors to go against their financial instincts, the Article proposes
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regulations that will empower the market to take the necessary steps to
ensure that it has an accurate picture of the financial conditions of public
companies.
I. THE INDEPENDENT OUTSIDE AUDITOR: A CORNERSTONE OF
CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
The federal securities laws require that "independent" public
accountants certify financial statements filed with the SEC by public
companies.3 The purpose of the requirement is to provide assurance that
"outside experts have examined a filer's financial statements and have
arrived at objective opinions about whether the filer's financial position,
results of operations, and cash flows are presented fairly in conformity
with [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles]." 4 Such independent
audits will ideally make the financial statements more reliable and
credible.' The specific requirement that the auditing firm be
independent is based on the policy view that lack, or perceived lack, of
auditor independence will undermine public confidence in financial
reporting, to the detriment of the securities markets. 6 Although the
auditor's client is the public company it audits, the current system views
the auditor's role to be that of a "public watchdog" with "ultimate
allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to
the investing public."7 The SEC over the years has implemented rules
and issued interpretations regarding what constitute violations of the
independence requirements.8 Article 2 of the SEC's Regulation S-X
contains the SEC's rules regarding the independence of auditors.9
3. In the Matter of KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43862/
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1360, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-
9500, at 14 & n.53 (Jan. 19, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/34-43862.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). See
25, 26 of Schedule A, Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25) and (26).
4. Id. at 13.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 14 (quoting U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984)).
8. FRANK C. MINTER et al., HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING & AUDITING B 1-18, B 1-
19 (2000) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING].
9. Id.atF1-8.
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The accounting industry's own professional standards for auditing,
GAAS, and accompanying rules for GAAS, also require auditors to be
independent.' ° One of the standards in GAAS is that "[iun all matters
relating to the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be
maintained by the auditor or auditors."" The American Institute of
Certified Accountants ("AICPA") promulgated rules of the Code of
Professional Conduct that provide detailed examples of impairment of
auditor independence, such as having a direct financial interest or
material indirect interest in the client. 12 The AICPA also provides
detailed interpretations addressing situations affecting independence,
including family relationships and litigation involving auditor and
client. 3 These SEC and professional rules and requirements shall be
referred as the "independence rules."
Although an outside auditor is required to be "independent" as
defined by the independence rules, a public company has complete
discretion in selecting its outside auditor. In particular, management
plays an influential role deciding which auditor to select and whether or
not the company's current auditor should be retained. Specifically, the
selection of an outside auditor involves the following: a company's
management proposes the selection of a firm that should serve as the
outside auditor, the company's audit committee, empowered by the full
board, confirms management's selection, and shareholders ratify the
selection.' 4 Each year, the audit committee evaluates the performance of
the outside auditor, but its evaluation depends largely on management's
views regarding the auditor.
15
ii. A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE: FAILURE OF OUTSIDE AUDITORS TO
DETECT AND PREVENT CORPORATE FINANCIAL SCANDALS
The corporate financial scandals in recent years show that the
current system of relying on company-hired auditors to audit corporate
financial statements is not working. Regardless of whether they were
deserving of blame, outside auditors failed to prevent a significant
10. Id. at Bl-17, BI-18.
11. General Standards 2, GAAS.
12. Handbook of Accounting, supra note 8, at BI-18.
13. Id.
14. Id. at B2-7, B2-27.
15. Id. at pp. B2-7, B2-8.
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increase in financial misstatements. These misstatements were often
blatant and massive. They resulted in large market losses and ultimately
shook the investing public's confidence in the U.S. securities markets.
The need to change the status quo is thus real and urgent.
A review of the number and nature of corporate financial
restatements, i.e., when a company revises public financial information
that was previously reported, shows the magnitude of the recent
financial scandals. According to a recent report by the United States
General Accounting Office, from 1997 through June 2002, the number
of restatements of financial results due to accounting irregularities
increased by approximately 145 percent. 6 In 1997, there were 92
corporate restatements, but by 2001, there were 225 restatements."
Increasingly, large mainstream public corporations, as opposed to small,
high-tech companies, are the companies issuing financial restatements.
8
For instance, the average market capitalization of a restating company
increased from $500 million in 1997 to $2 billion in 2002.19 The
number of restatements from NYSE-listed companies also increased
during this period.20
Outside auditors failed to prevent massive and arguably obvious
financial misstatements. Corporate financial scandals such as Enron,
WorldCom, Adelphia and Xerox involved apparent breach of the federal
securities laws and, in particular, blatant fraudulent misconduct of
16. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET
IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES, GAO-03-138, at 4
(Oct. 2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
17. Id.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id. (The median increased from $143 million to $351 million).
20. Id.
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massive proportions. 21 In some cases, corporate officials were accused
of outright looting of corporate assets.22
The outside auditors' failure to prevent the financial misstatements
resulted in significant economic losses. 23  These financial scandals
severely damaged the American economy.24 For instance, some of the
corporate financial failures led to the loss of "approximately $5 trillion
in market capitalization from the U.S. capital markets since its high in
March 2000," or approximately $60,000 per U.S. household. Equally
disturbing is that the financial misstatements have severely shaken
investor confidence in the U.S. securities markets.26 For instance,
surveys show that since February 2002, investors polled identified
questionable accounting practices as the leading reason for a significant
decline in investor optimism about the market.
27
The economic incentives for financial misstatements continue to
exist. The financial fraud has been caused in large part by pressure for
corporate management to meet or exceed analysts' expectations of
corporate earnings. Even if a corporation has a profitable quarter, its
stock price may decrease if analysts earlier had predicted stronger
earnings. 2' By the end of a quarter, the stock price has already
21. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at Appendix V et seq.; William
Powers, Jr., Raymond S. Troubh & Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., Report of Investigation by
the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Feb. 1,
2002) (letter and report from Chairman of the Board, William Powers, Jr.); SEC v.
WorldCom, Inc., Civ. Action No. 02-CV-4963 (JSR), Lit. Release No. 17829 (Nov. 1,
2002)/Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1658 (Nov. 5, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl7829.htm (last visited Nov. 25,
2003).
22. For instance, Adelphia officers were accused, among other things, of using
corporate funds to pay for personal ownership of the Buffalo Sabres hockey team.
Joseph Nocera et al., System Failure: Corporate America Has Lost Its Way. Here's a
Roadmap to Restoring Confidence, FORTUNE, June 9, 2002, at 62.
23. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 16; Paul S. Atkins, Remarks at the
Federalist Society 20th Annual Convention (Nov. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch 1I1402psa.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
24. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 16; Atkins, supra note 23.
25. Atkins, supra note 23.
26. GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 32-41.
27. Id. at 34.
28. Norman S. Johnson, Speech by then SEC Commissioner at the Utah State Bar
Mid-Year Convention (Mar. 6, 1999), available at
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incorporated the analysts' expectation of what the earnings should be.29
Thus, regardless of whether a company is profitable, if actual earnings
do not meet expectations, the stock price will adjust accordingly.3
Coupled with the emphasis in stock options for compensating
executives, there is tremendous pressure for management to meet analyst
expectations.3' As a result, despite current enforcement actions against
financial fraud, there continues to be a strong incentive for corporate
management to "fudge" the numbers.32
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO CORPORATE FINANCIAL SCANDALS: THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
To address the corporate financial scandals and the resulting crisis
in investor confidence, one of the primary goals of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act is to provide greater assurance of auditor independence in addition
to improving the quality of audits. 33  First, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to regulate
accountants who perform audits of public companies.34 The Board has
the authority to establish rules regarding auditing, quality control, and
independence standards for public accounting firms.35  Further, it is
responsible for conducting periodic inspections of public accounting
firms to assess the firms' and associated persons' compliance with
applicable rules and standards.36 It is also responsible for conducting
investigations and instituting disciplinary proceedings against the public
accounting firms or their associated persons for violation of any
applicable rules and standards.37
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch264.htm (last visited Nov.
10, 2003). In fact, Commissioner Johnson identified pressure to meet analyst
expectations as the "single most important cause" of earnings management. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 244.
34. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 1, at §§ 101-09.
35. Id. at § 103.
36. Id. at § 104.
37. Id. at § 105.
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Second, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also addresses the concern
regarding auditor independence by placing restrictions on auditors'
ability to perform non-audit services for their audit clients.38 Section
201(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits a registered public
accounting firm that performs an audit of a public company's financial
statements (and any person associated with such a firm) to provide to
that public company, "contemporaneously with the audit, any non-audit
services."39 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act identifies nine specific categories
of prohibited services. They are: (i) bookkeeping or other services
related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit
client; (ii) financial information systems design and implementation; (iii)
appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind
reports; (iv) actuarial services; (v) internal audit outsourcing services;
(vi) management or human resources functions; (vii) broker or dealer,
investment adviser, or investment banking services; (viii) legal services
and expert services unrelated to the audit; and (ix) any other service that
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board determines, by
regulation, is impermissible.40  As part of this section, the SEC has
implemented rules toward defining and prohibiting such services.4' The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC's rules under that Act allow
accountants to continue to provide tax services such as tax compliance,
tax planning, and tax advice to audit clients, subject to certain audit
committee pre-approval requirements.4 ' Additionally, the rules require
audited companies to disclose the amount of fees paid to the accounting
firm for tax services.
43
38. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 244.
39. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 1, at § 20 1(a).
40. Id.
41. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8183; 34-47265; 35-27642; IC-25915; IA-
2103, FR-68, File No. S7-49-02 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2003).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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iv. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LACK OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND
FINANCIAL MISSTATEMENTS
Facts alleged in SEC enforcement actions and private civil lawsuits
strongly suggest that lack of independence played an important role in
auditors' failure to prevent some of the financial misstatements. The
problem appears to be systemic since a majority of the large audit firms
have been accused of significant violations. In addition, the fact that a
number of audit firms allegedly violated the federal securities laws
and/or the independence rules despite prior enforcement sanctions
indicates that SEC enforcement actions and independence rules, by
themselves, cannot ensure auditor independence when auditors are
seduced by lucrative fees and financial incentives.
A. Arthur Andersen
In Newby v. Enron,44 class action plaintiffs alleged that Arthur
Andersen, as Enron's outside auditor, violated the federal securities laws
because it "knew, was concerned about, yet covered up or ignored
fraudulent accounting practices by Enron.' '45 According to the
complaint, a primary reason for Arthur Andersen's alleged misconduct
was its lack of independence.4 6 The complaint also alleged that Enron
was Arthur Andersen's second largest client, generating approximately
$50 million in fees annually for Arthur Andersen.47 Finally, according
to the complaint, the audit firm pressured its audit partner to solicit and
market lucrative consulting services to Enron, resulting in a conflict of
48interest.
Enron was not Arthur Andersen's first exposure to allegations of
massive audit failure. Anderson was accused of improper audits in
financial scandals including Waste Management, Sunbeam Corporation
and Baptist Foundation of Arizona, resulting in the firm paying large
sums for settlement.49
44. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.
Tex. 2002).
45. See id. at 679.
46. Id. at 676-77.
47. Id. at 673.
48. Id. at 676-77.
49. Id. at 675.
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B. KPMG
In 2003, the SEC filed a civil injunctive action against KPMG
alleging that it violated the antifraud provision of the federal securities
laws in connection with its audit of Xerox Corporation.0 The SEC
alleged that KPMG affiliate offices in Europe, Brazil, Canada and Japan,
as well as KPMG auditors in the United States, repeatedly warned the
KPMG engagement partners for Xerox "that manipulative actions taken
by Xerox to improve revenues and earnings were unnecessary, were not
adequately tested, and distorted true business results."'" The KPMG
partners, "who worked near Xerox headquarters in Stamford,
Connecticut, or at KPMG's New York headquarters, gave little weight
to these warnings from on-the-scene KPMG affiliates and did not
demand that Xerox justify the reasons for departures from historic
accounting methods or establish the accuracy of the new, manipulative
practices."" According to the SEC, although KPMG "occasionally
voiced concern to Xerox management about the 'topside accounting
devices' developed and manipulated by senior corporate financial
managers to increase revenue and earnings, the defendants did little or
nothing when Xerox ignored their concerns and continued manipulating
its financial results."53  The SEC alleged that the "defendants then
knowingly or recklessly set aside their reservations, failed in their
professional duties as auditors, and gave a clean bill of health to Xerox's
financial statements. 54
Significantly, the SEC identified lucrative fees as a motive for
KPMG's misconduct.5 5 According to the SEC complaint, KPMG was
paid $26 million for auditing Xerox's financial results for fiscal years
50. SEC v. KPMG LLP, 2003 WL 1842871 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2003). See also
SEC Litig. Release No. 17954 (Jan. 29, 2003)/SEC Accounting & Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 1709 (Jan. 29, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17954.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003)
[hereinafter SEC Release No. 17954].
51. SEC Release No. 17954, supra note 50.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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1997 through 2000.56 It was paid $56 million for non-audit services
during that period.57 As a result, "[r]ather than put at risk a lucrative
financial relationship with a premier client, the defendants failed to
challenge Xerox's improper accounting actions and make the company
accurately report its financial results." 58
The 2003 action against KPMG again shows the difficulty in
deterring auditor misconduct linked to independence failure because the
SEC had previously sanctioned KPMG for violations of independence
rules. In January 2001, as part of its review of an appeal from an earlier
SEC administrative proceeding, the Commission concluded that KPMG
violated independence rules in 1996 because of its business
arrangements with a corporation that it audited. 59 Specifically, the
Commission concluded that KPMG was not independent when it audited
a public corporation's financial statements and issued audit reports while
loans from KPMG to a corporate officer were outstanding and when
KPMG had the right to receive a fee contingent on the corporation's
financial success.60 Among other things, the Commission found that
KPMG violated Rule 2-02(b) of Regulation S-X, by having transactions,
interests, or relationships that will impair its independence under Rule 2-
01 of Regulation S-X or under GAAS.6'
C. PricewaterhouseCoopers
In 2002, the SEC instituted an enforcement action against
PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC") for violating the independence rules
with regard to a number of its audit clients. This was the first SEC
enforcement action alleging that an auditor's independence violation
56. SEC v. KPMG LLP, No. 03-671, 2003 WL 1842871 11 (S.D.N.Y. April 9,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp17954.htm (last
visited Nov. 21, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Complaint No. 03-67 1].
57. Id. at 131.
58. SEC Release No. 17954, supra note 50.
59. In the Matter of KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No.
43862/Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Release No. AE-1360, Admin. Proc. File
No. 3-9500 (Jan. 19, 2001), available at 2001 WL 34138819.
60. Id.
61. Id.
2004] ALTERNATIVE TO "INDEPENDENT" AUDITOR 359
was directly connected to actual financial misstatements by a company.
62
The SEC administrative order alleged that PwC failed to be independent
because it had lucrative financial interests that were tied to its audit
clients.63
First, PwC charged contingent fees to a number of its audit clients,
in direct violation of independence rules. 64 In 14 instances, a securities
firm wholly owned by PwC performed investment banking services for
public audit clients of PwC pursuant to arrangements under which the
clients would pay a contingent fee.65 These fees violated the express
prohibition on contingent fees contained in Rule 302 of the AICPA
Code of Professional Conduct and caused PwC to lack the requisite
independence when the audits were performed for the public audit
clients in question.66
Second, PwC audited non-audit fees paid by the audit client to PwC
itself.67 PwC issued an unqualified audit report on Pinnacle's 1999
financial statements and performed interim reviews of Pinnacle's
quarterly reports for the first three quarters of 2000.68 As part of its
audit and quarterly reviews of Pinnacle, PwC caused Pinnacle's failure
to account properly for certain costs, including non-audit fees paid by
Pinnacle to PwC.69 The fees were related to Pinnacle's acquisition of
communications site space from Motorola, Inc.7° Pinnacle improperly
established at least $24 million in liabilities and improperly capitalized
approximately $8.5 million in costs, of which approximately $6.8
million involved fees paid to PwC for non-audit services. 7' As a result,
PwC was a cause of Pinnacle's periodic reporting, books and records,
and internal control violations. PwC also failed to exercise objective and
impartial judgment as required by the independence rules and therefore
62. In the Matter of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and PricewaterhouseCoopers
Securities LLC/Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1596 (July 17,
2002); Admin. Proc. File No. 3-10835, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46216.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2003).
63. Id.
64. Id. at III.C.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at III.D.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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lacked the requisite independence in its audit of Pinnacle's 1999
financial statements and in its interim reviews of Pinnacle's quarterly
reports for the first three quarters of 2000.72
Third, PwC performed improper accounting for a software project
performed by PwC consultants. Specifically, PwC issued an unqualified
audit report on Avon's 1999 financial statements.73 In connection with
the audit, PwC was a cause of Avon's failure to write off all of the
capitalized costs of an uncompleted software project that PwC
consultants had been developing for Avon, but which Avon stopped and
wound down. 74 In violation of GAAP, Avon wrote off only part of the
project's $42 million of costs, improperly retaining on its books $26
million that was comprised mostly of PwC's own consulting fees. 75 As
a result, PwC was a cause of Avon's reporting and record keeping
violations and failed to exercise objective and impartial judgment as
required by the independence rules and therefore lacked the requisite
independence in its audit of Avon's 1999 financial statements. 76
The SEC found that PwC: (a) failed to comply with the
independence requirements of Regulation S-X; (b) was a cause of
violations of periodic filing and books and records provisions of Section
13(a) and (b) of the Exchange Act and the rules thereunder by public
issuers who were PwC audit clients; and (c) engaged in improper
professional conduct under Rule 102(e).77 The SEC also found that PwC
violated Regulation S-X, and caused its clients' violations of periodic
filing provisions in Exchange Act Section 13(a) and Rule 13a-1.78
The 2002 action against PwC shows that enforcement action was
not entirely effective in deterring PwC from violating the independence
rules because it was not the first time PwC was caught with widespread,
systemic violation of the independence rules. In 1999, the SEC instituted
an administrative enforcement action against PwC for violation of the
72. Id.
73. Id. at III.E.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at IV.
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SEC's independence rules.79 In that case, the SEC found that PwC
partners and employees violated independence rules by owning shares of
PwC's audit clients.80 Specifically, in four instances, certain PwC
professionals owned securities of publicly-held audit clients for which
they provided professional services.8' In 31 instances, individual PwC
partners owned securities of publicly-held audit clients for which the
partners provided no professional services and individual managers
owned securities of publicly-held audit clients of their office for which
the managers provided no professional services. In 45 instances, a
retirement plan associated with PwC owned securities of publicly-held
audit clients.83 Each of these instances was contrary to Rule 2-01(b) of
Regulation S-X and GAAS, which require, among other things, that
public accounting firms and their partners and certain professionals not
have, or commit to acquire, any direct or material indirect financial
interest in their audit clients.8 4 PwC settled with the SEC by consent to
an administrative order, which involved undertakings to reform the
firm's procedures regarding securities trading by its employees. 85
D. Ernst & Youn"
Ernst & Young was also accused of violating independence rules in
connection with its client's financial misstatements. In 2002, the SEC
instituted an administrative proceeding against Ernst & Young LLP
("E&Y"). In that action, the SEC's Division of Enforcement alleged
that E&Y audited the financial statements of PeopleSoft, Inc. in fiscal
years 1994 through 1999 while E&Y and PeopleSoft engaged in joint
business relationships.8 6 As a result, E&Y was alleged to have violated
79. In the Matter of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Exchange Act Release No.
40945 (Jan. 14, 1999); Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1098 (Jan.
14, 1999), Admin. Proc. File No. 3-9809, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-40945.txt (last visited Dec. 18, 2003).
80. Id.
81. Id. at III.A.2.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at II.B, III.C and IV.
85. Id. at V.
86. In the Matter of Ernst & Young LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 46710 (Oct.
23, 2002)/Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1654 (Oct. 23, 2002),
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auditor independence requirements.8 7 In addition, it was accused of
causing PeopleSoft's alleged violations of the Exchange Act, and
engaging in improper professional conduct."8
E. The Difficulty ofEnforcing Independence
The above cases show that, despite a vigorous enforcement effort, it
is difficult to force an auditor to be independent when there are strong
financial incentives for the auditor not to be so. First, a common theme
in these cases is that lucrative financial gains played a role in causing the
auditors to violate the independence rules. Second, these cases show
that lack of independence is a widespread and systemic problem in the
accounting industry, despite the existence of independence rules. The
enforcement actions above reflect violations or possible violations by
four of the major accounting firms. The violations were not committed
by a few rotten apples but instead were either widespread within the
firms or approved by senior members of the firm. Third, a number of
the enforcement actions involved blatant violations of clear-cut
prohibitions of the independence rules and thus one can argue that the
auditors violated the rules with open-eyes. Finally, as in the case of
PwC, prior enforcement actions against independence rules violations
did not deter the firms from further misconduct.
One may argue that the threat of harsher sanctions may overcome
the lure of lucrative consulting fees and thus adequately enforce
compliance of auditor independence rules. The reality is that
enforcement actions require resources. When tougher enforcement
sanctions are sought, the auditing firms will have a greater incentive to
pursue litigation as opposed to settlement. Further, draconian sanctions,
particularly against a firm, may create unintended victims.8 9
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-10786, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/34-
467 10.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2003).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. For instance, the criminal conviction of Arthur Andersen for obstruction of
justice effectively ended the firm's auditing business, resulting in more than 25,000
Andersen employees losing their jobs at the firm. Arthur Andersen Closing the Book on
Its Auditing Business, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 1, 2002, at 3.
Of course, there are ways to increase sanctions against accounting firms without ending
their existence. For instance, in the Ernst & Young litigation, the SEC's Division of
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Nor will additional rules and restrictions necessarily result in actual
independence on the part of company-hired auditors. Although the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act establishes more restrictions on consulting fees,
such regulations may merely result in auditors finding ways to evade the
rules rather than increasing their efforts at improving their
independence. As one commentator noted, the recent financial scandals
''are not so much a failure of laws and regulations as they are a failure of
behavior."90 One danger of having more rules to regulate corporate or
professional behavior is that regulated parties will focus on "navigating
around the regulations" without actually violating them," in other words,
complying with the letter but ignoring the spirit of the regulations. 91
Similarly, SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins, commenting generally about
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, warned of the danger of merely reacting in an
effort "to do something," as opposed to addressing the underlying
problems.9 The above analysis of past enforcement actions on auditor
independence shows that auditors did not merely evade then existing
independence rules, but blatantly violated them, and did so in a
widespread manner. The apparent motive of many of the clear-cut
violations is the auditors' desire for lucrative consulting fees. Thus, past
history indicates that auditing firms, rather than amending their
behavior, may violate independence rules under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
or vigorously fight the enforcement of these restrictions.
Enforcement is seeking to prevent the firm from accepting new clients for six months, a
remedy that a commentator characterizes as experimental. Paula Dwyer, The Big Four:
Too Few To Fail?, Bus. WK., Sept. 1, 2003, at 30. To create additional incentives for
auditing firms to ensure that their employees comply with relevant rules, the SEC's
Division of Enforcement has embarked on a policy of suing auditing firms based solely
on liability imputed from their employees. Speech by Stephen M. Cutler, Director,
Division of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks Before the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, (Dec. 12 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch 121202smc.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2003). The
SEC applied this policy against PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP in a settled
administrative action in May 2003. Matter of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 47900/Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No.
1787, Admin. Proc. No. 3-11132 (May 22, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.govlitigation/admin/34-47900.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2003).
90. Jeffrey L. Seglin, Will More Rules Yield Better Corporate Behavior?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at 4.
91. Id.
92. Atkins, supra note 23.
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V. THE ILLUSION OF INDEPENDENCE: OUTSIDE AUDITORS' FINANCIAL
TIES TO CORPORATIONS
The root problem of the current system of company-hired outside
auditors is that there is a misalignment of financial interests. Outside
auditors' financial interests are not necessarily aligned with the financial
interests of the investing public, i.e., the party with the greatest interest
in the accuracy of corporate financial interest. None of the previous or
recent laws and regulations addresses the fundamental conflict of
interest of an outside auditor: a public company selects and pays the
auditor that audits the company. Under the current system, the
company, through its board of directors, nominates the outside auditor
and the nomination must be approved by shareholder votes. Despite the
requirement of shareholder votes, corporate management's choice
carries a great deal of weight in the ultimate decision. Management
participates, as part of the board, in the board's nomination. Typically,
only one candidate is presented to the shareholders for vote.93 As a
result, it is likely under this system that management's choice will be
affirmed by shareholders. Just as important is the fact that the public
company holds the outside auditor's purse strings with respect to fees
for outside audits, even though the ban on consulting services may have
cut off one source of temptation. In fact, as a result of the recent
backlash against corporate financial fraud, audit fees have increased
significantly and thus continue to be a fundamental source of conflict for
an outside auditor.94  While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may reduce the
93. For similar reasons, one commentator opined that independent directors are not
truly independent:
For the overwhelming majority of corporations, board independence is a chimera ....
The problem is that board members are not selected by the shareholders that they are
supposed to represent. Instead, directors are chosen by a nominating committee
usually consisting solely of board members and usually including the CEO as a key
participant .... But the committee will in all cases wind up nominating one person
for each vacancy. The choices are then submitted to shareholders for a "vote"....
[F]ew people vote, but more importantly, since there is no contested vacancy, brokers
who hold your shares will vote them for the board's nominees if you do nothing. The
brokers are, in fact, obliged to do so.
David Gale, How to Create Truly Independent Boards, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at
A10.
94. Calmetta Coleman & Cassell Bryan-Low, Audit Fees Rise, And Investors May
Pay Price, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at Cl; Tough New World: The Accounting
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pressure on audit partners to generate fees through their consulting
business, the pressure for audit partners to generate fees still exists, and
the pressure is intense. 95 For instance, at Arthur Andersen, the very
structure and culture of auditing firms were designed to force out
partners who did not generate sufficient revenue:
Traditionally, Andersen partners each had a pyramid of employees
reporting to them-from rookie accountants to senior audit
managers. Partners' compensation was based on the number of
shares they owned in the partnership-called "units." The more
units you had, the higher your pay. And the easiest way to increase
the value of each unit was to limit the number of partners divvying
up the profits .... Greene was in charge of Andersen's West Coast
audit business .... He saw the need to reduce costs, and responded
by making cuts, as partners were transferred or counseled to look for
jobs elsewhere. But "it never seemed to be enough," he said.9
6
In light of the constant pressure to generate revenue, corporate
management continues to have a strong influence over auditors because
management continues to affect the decisions regarding whether or not
to retain an auditor and regarding the size of the audit fee. Restricting
consulting fees merely shifts the pressure back to audit fees.
The fact that a corporation pays the fees of the auditor not only may
cause the integrity of the audit to be compromised, it may also cause the
quality of the audit to be compromised. Because it holds the purse
strings, corporate management often is able to put pressure on the audit
team to complete audits within severe time and budget constraints.97
Such pressure places stress on the audit team and may affect the quality
of the audit.98 In some cases, such pressures "may have contributed to
the auditors' failure to detect material misstatements." 99 As shown by
Industry Expects More Litigation and Higher Audit Fees, ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 2002, at
58.
95. Tough New World: The Accounting Industry Expects More Litigation and
Higher Audit Fees, supra note 94.
96. Flynn McRoberts, Civil War Splits Andersen, CHI. TRiB., Sept. 2, 2002, at 1.
97. The Pub. Oversight Board, The Panel On Audit Effectiveness: Report and
Recommendations, at 105 (Aug. 31, 2000), available at http://www.pobauditpanel.org
(last visited Nov. 23, 2003).
98. Id. at 105-06.
99. Id. at 106.
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the recent cases of massive audit failures, auditors succumb to the
pressure despite the threat of liability from class action litigation.
In addition, despite the trend toward higher audit fees, as long as a
public company pays the auditor's fees, the financial incentive is for
outside auditors to do no more than is required by GAAS. There is no
financial incentive for public auditors to "go the extra mile" and perform
additional audits or take creative or innovative steps to review or
analyze the public company's financial data. In fact, there are
disincentives from taking steps beyond what is required by GAAS
because the auditor may have a difficult time convincing management
that the additional fees are justified.
The lack of financial incentives to do more than is required by
GAAS is problematic because GAAS are not sufficient to detect fraud in
financial reporting. First, GAAS do not require outside auditors to
perform forensic accounting, i.e., auditing procedures designed to detect
fraud.00 Second, the provisions under GAAS to address potential fraud
are deficient. Specifically, GAAS require auditors to assess the risk of
fraud in planning their audits, including assessing risk factors such as
"management's characteristics and influence over the control
environment, some of which relate to the motivation for management to
engage in fraudulent financial reporting, and personal characteristics
bearing on integrity and management style."'01 In reality, however, the
risk factors identified under GAAS for audit planning are subjective.0 2
Further, even when certain risk factors exist, whether or not to undertake
certain audit procedures, such as forensic procedures and techniques,
depends very much on the judgment of the auditor.'0 3 In fact, according
to the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, a panel appointed by the Public
Oversight Board to study the effectiveness of the auditing profession,
the risk assessment approach under GAAS is not effective in detecting
fraud because GAAS fail to identify or direct auditing procedures
toward fraud detection.'04 For instance, the panel found that GAAS
assume that collusion among corporate officers and employees to
commit financial fraud as "impossible" and assumes that management
100. Id. at 76.
101. Id. (citing Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 86.
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possesses integrity.' 05 In light of the insufficient emphasis under GAAS
to detect fraud, the Panel found some auditors to be uncertain about their
responsibility and ability to detect fraud in their audits. 10 6 The Panel
also found little evidence of any significant use of forensic auditing
techniques in GAAS audits.'0 7
Further, unless the auditor can point to a specific "red flag" or
suspicious transaction, he or she will risk offending management who
may view the additional procedures to reflect doubts about
management's veracity. Considering the fact that management has a
primary role in paying audit fees and also in selecting auditors, an
auditor simply has no incentive to do any more than is perceived to be
the minimum required by GAAS.
In addition, it is unlikely under the current system that an outside
auditor will express suspicion of improper activities unless it has
concrete evidence, since any discussion of suspicion or concern may
incur the wrath of management, the same management that selects and
pays the auditor.
Behavioral research (based on psychology and related disciplines)
regarding auditor behavior also suggests that auditors are willing to
compromise their audits in order to please their corporate clients.
Reviewing a number of behavioral studies and experiments regarding
auditors from the field of psychology, decision theory, behavioral
finance and behavioral economics, Professor Robert Prentice concludes
that auditors' work is affected by their "self-serving bias."' 8 According
to Professor Prentice, these studies and experiments show that auditors
are "reluctant to issue qualified opinions regarding their clients, reluctant
to refuse their clients' requests for improper accounting treatment, and
105. Id.
106. Id. at 85.
107. Id. at 85-86. In late 2002, the AICPA adopted SAS No. 99 to provide further
guidance for detecting fraud during audits, including consideration of management's
ability to override internal control to perpetrate fraud. Statement of Auditing Standards
No. 99 (Dec. 15, 2002). While providing more detailed guidance, the factors listed in
SAS No. 99 are still subjective and the application depends very much on judgments of
the auditors. Id.
108. Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias
for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, at 1669 (2000).
368 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LA W
reluctant to drop clients seeking such improper treatment for fear of
imperiling a stream of revenue."109
Even when economic factors create incentives for auditing firms to
perform audits adequately, individual members of the auditing team may
have incentives to do otherwise. Professor Prentice, in reviewing
behavioral studies, noted that an audit partner may be more willing than
an audit firm as a whole to take risks with an audit client."0 The reason
is that the financial benefits from serving a client are concentrated with a
few partners and offices, while the costs of litigation tend to be more
distributed across the firm."' Similarly, one can imagine a partner under
the threat of being "forced out" for generating insufficient revenue, may
be more willing than the firm as a whole to accepting a client's
questionable accounting treatment.
Auditors' biases in favor of their clients, the corporations, are
particularly powerful, and difficult to curb by regulation, because they
are often subconscious. Based on behavioral experiments, Professors
Bazerman, Loewenstein and Moore, argue that because of the subjective
nature of accounting, and the close financial and personal ties of auditors
and corporate managers, "even the most honest and meticulous of
auditors can unintentionally distort the numbers in ways that mask a
company's true financial status .... ,,2 In addition, "[u]nlike conscious
corruption, unconscious bias cannot be deterred by threats of jail
time." ' 13 In a study of 139 auditors employed at large U.S. accounting
firms, half of the participants were asked to assume that they were
auditors hired by the company while the other half were asked to assume
they were hired by another company that conducts business with the
audited company." 4 With respect to five given ambiguous auditing
vignettes, auditors who were hypothetically hired by the audited
company were on the average 30% more likely to find the financial
reports complied with GAAP." 5
109. Id. at 1604.
110. Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight
Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 133, 184 (2000).
111. Id.
112. Bazerman, Loewenstein and Moore, Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits,
HARv. Bus. REv., at 3 (Nov. 2002).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 6. The study was conducted with Prof. Lloyd Tanlu.
115. Id.
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In light of similar struggles in the legal profession, it is not
surprising that auditors struggle to maintain independence when
corporate management holds the purse strings. An attorney is expected
to represent his client zealously because it is his or her fiduciary duty
under the ethical rules of the profession. Just as importantly, an attorney
is motivated to represent his client's interest because the client pays him
or her legal fees. However, when the financial interests are not aligned,
the attorney's willingness to represent the client's interest becomes
clouded. For instance, in situations where insurance companies select
and pay for attorneys to represent the insured, conflicts of interest may
result, often to the detriment of the insured party's interest.
16
Regulations and ethical rules can only do so much against powerful
financial interests.
Since additional regulation cannot ensure auditor independence,
what then, if any, are the alternatives to a corporate financial reporting
system that depends on supposedly independent, but fundamentally
biased, auditors? While government-run audits will be truly
independent from corporate management, this solution has been
dismissed as too costly and inefficient. 17 On the other hand, Professor
Joshua Ronen proposed a more market-oriented approach where insurers
providing corporations with liability insurance for financial
misstatements will hire auditors to assess the accuracy of the covered
corporation's financial statements." 8  Although the auditor in that
proposed system will owe allegiance to the insurance company, it does
not adequately address the influence of management. While the
116. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, at 95-101 (1987).
117. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING, supra note 8, at Al- 10:
In theory, the most reliable way of guaranteeing auditor independence would be to
establish a public authority, vest it with the responsibility for conducting audits, and
charge all publicly held firms an annual fee for the service. The disadvantages of such
a system would, however, ultimately outweigh the benefits of guaranteeing auditor
independence. In particular, economic pressure for audit efficiency would be reduced
for both parties if the company were not paying directly for services rendered. The
removal of the economic incentive for efficiency, and the presumed weakening of
communication links between the assigned auditor and client, would likely contribute
to more expensive and less thorough, albeit more independent, financial reports.
Id.
118. Joshua Ronen, A Market Solution to the Accounting Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
2002, at A21.
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insurance company will have an incentive to avoid risk of covering a
company that misstates its financials, it also has the financial incentive
to earn premiums from the company. For instance, an insurance
company known for hiring aggressive auditors may lose its business to a
competitor that hires more lenient auditors. In addition, the same
behavioral bias described above will still exist, albeit in milder form. In
sum, the governmental approach is too costly and the insurance
company approach does not go far enough.
Professor Ronen's market-oriented approach, while it does not
adequately resolve financial dependence on corporate management, does
point in the right direction. As discussed below, a system in which
auditors are hired by investors, a system where the auditors' interests are
totally aligned with the investors' interests, provides the best alternative
to the current system of company-hired auditors.
VI. HIRE YOUR OwN AUDITOR
Rather than struggling with maintaining the independence of the
auditor of a company, one possible approach is to create an environment
for interested parties, such as institutional investors, to hire their own
accountants or other financial professionals to review and analyze the
financial data of public corporations. These professionals will not be
independent. Instead, they will have a clear economic incentive to
protect the interest of their employers. As a result, it will be in their
financial interest to ensure that the financial statements of a corporation
accurately reflect the corporation's financial condition.
A. Likely Existence of Demand by the Public to Hire Its Own Auditors
There are many parties outside of a public corporation, such as
institutional investors, that have an interest in determining the true
financial status of the corporation. By making available to the public a
company's underlying financial data, there will likely be a large number
of entities or persons, beyond a corporation's auditor or audit committee,
who will want to retain their own accountants or financial experts to
audit or review the raw financial data and question management about
the data. These individuals and institutions have the resources and
motivations to hire such experts as their auditors. For instance, the large
holdings in public companies by institutional investors, particularly
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public pension funds and union pension funds, have made such entities
increasingly active in the governance of public corporations. 1 9 The
same institutional investors have also been victims in the recent financial
scandals. For instance, the Regents of the University of California and
the Washington State Investment Board are plaintiffs in class action
suits regarding Enron.120  Their participation in the massive litigation
suggests that the same institutional investors would be keen to expend
resources to obtain accurate financial information and avoid the losses
such as those from the Enron debacle. Securities professionals, such as
broker-dealers, would want to have accurate financial information to
provide the proper recommendations to their customers. Portfolio
managers of mutual funds will want the same accurate information to
make the best decision for the funds. In light of the large number of
individual investors in this country, the media has an interest also, since
providing correct assessment of a corporation's financial health will
attract readers or viewers. Even individuals or entities without sufficient
funds may be able to pool their resources to hire an auditor. Finally, an
audit firm may provide its analyses and reports to investor subscribers.
Institutional investors' demand for conflict-free stock research and
analysis is a strong indication of their likely interest in hiring their own
auditors. Recent cases indicate that stock analysts at investment banks
may have compromised their supposed independent research to provide
favorable coverage of companies to obtain or maintain investment-
banking business from such companies. As a result, institutional
investors are increasingly willing to pay and obtain stock research from
analyst firms that do not have ties to investment banking.'2 '
119. See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and
Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FiN. EcoN. 275, 278
(2000) (reporting that the number of poison pill resolutions declined between 1991 and
1994).
120. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.
Tex. 2002).
121. David Rynecki, The Bernstein Way: There Is a Firm That Does Research
Right, FORTUNE, June 10, 2002, at 85 (discussing why approximately 5,000 institutional
investors retained the analyst firm Sanford C. Bernstein, a firm with no ties to
investment banking businesses, for its "conflict-free" stock research reports).
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B. Prerequisite for Investor-Hired Auditors: Access to Corporate
Financial Information and Corporate Management
Institutional investors and others in the public may find it desirable
to have their own accountants audit or otherwise review the financial
statements of public companies in which they invest. However, such
investor-hired accountants will be able to do little since they will not
have access to the same level of corporate financial information as the
outside auditor hired by the company. The reality is that corporate
financial data that exists within a company, and is accessible to its
auditor, is far better, both in details and in timeliness, than the financial
information available to the public.
1. Financial Information Available to the Public
The federal securities laws require a public corporation to file with
the Securities and Exchange Commission its quarterly financial
statements, Forms 10-Q, at the end of each quarter.12 They also require
a public corporation to file its audited annual financial statements,
Forms 10-K, at the end of each fiscal year. 123 In turn, the SEC makes
these statements available to the public. The corporation itself is
responsible for ensuring that Forms 10-Q and 10-K are prepared
pursuant to GAAP. However, these statements represent corporate
management's summary of the corporate financial data. In addition,
since they are only released quarterly and annually, an investor cannot
get up-to-date financial statements during the period between their
releases.
Aside from the filing of Forms 10-K and 10-Q, corporate
management may occasionally issue public statements regarding its
financial condition. 124 For instance, sometimes management issues such
statements when it does not believe that it will meet analyst
expectations. Management does so to decrease the inevitable fall in the
122. Sections 13 and 15(d) of Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d)
(2002).
123. Id.
124. Robert M. Lawless et al., The Influence of Legal Liability on Corporate
Financial Signaling, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 209, 210 (1998) (stating thatr a firm's
managers "can elect to disclose their data directly with investors and shareholders
through a public announcement such as a press release").
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stock price when actual earnings are announced and the market realizes
that the earnings failed to meet expectations. The federal securities laws
provide for a safe harbor against civil liability for such forward-looking
statements, but only if certain specific conditions are met.125 Because of
concerns with legal liability, corporate managers often send out vague
signals regarding a company's financial condition rather than to issue an
explicit press statement. 26 Because management does not issue such
statements on a regular or frequent basis, it is difficult for investors to
depend on these statements to make investment decisions. They also
tend to be less reliable than financial statements because they generally
are not as detailed as a financial statement. In addition, they are
unreliable because management uses such releases primarily to influence
stock price.
2. The Financial Information Monopoly: Financial Information
Available Within a Corporation
A company typically maintains a general journal or book of original
entry to record, as they occur, events that affect the company
financially. 27 For instance, on the same day Company A sells a widget,
a corporate employee would make a journal entry in the company's
general journal to record the sale.'28 A company also maintains a ledger
to keep track of specific items or accounts, such as accounts showing
how much customers owe the company, i.e., accounts receivable, or how
much the company owes its suppliers, i.e., accounts payable. Anytime a
journal entry is made, the ledger is updated to reflect resulting changes
in any accounts. 29 The company then summarizes data from its general
journal and its ledger in its monthly, quarterly and annual financial
statements, consisting of an income statement, a balance sheet and a
125. Section 21E of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k (1998).
126. Lawless, supra note 124, at 219.
127. Steven A. Finkler, FINANCE & ACCOUNTING FOR NONFINANCIAL MANAGERS,
57-58 (1992).
128. In this scenario, the sale occurs at a specific point in time and thus is recorded
as it occurs. Some financial events occur continuously over time, such as the
accumulation of interest. Instead of making daily journal entries to record these
continuous events, the corporation makes adjusting entries shortly prior to a quarterly or
annual financial statement to bring these accounts up-to-date. Id. at 69, 71.
129. Id. at 72-74.
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statement of cash flows. 30 Corporations with subsidiaries or divisions
consolidate the financial statements from these subsidiaries or divisions
into a single set of financial statements. In addition, a company
obviously will have data, in the form of its bank and brokerage
statements, that reflect cash and securities it holds in accounts at banks
and securities broker-dealer firms, and any transactions in these
accounts. A public corporation is not required to disclose to the public
its general journal, its ledger or its monthly financial statements, nor is it
required to disclose its financial information on an unconsolidated basis.
It is also not required to disclose its bank or brokerage account
statements to the public.
3. Financial Information Available to the Outside Auditor Hired by the
Audited Company
In performing its audit of a public corporation's financial
statements, an outside auditor has access to the financial data that are
available within the corporation, even though such data may not be
available to the public.' 3 ' For example, the principal means of auditing a
corporation's financial statements is to compare the statement figures to
the corporation's internal accounting records and to the original
evidence of transactions.' As a result, when an auditor attempts to
verify an amount in the corporation's financial statements, he may do so
by reviewing the corporation's accounting records by tracing the amount
through the ledgers and to the journals. In addition, the auditor may
review source documentary records maintained by the corporation, such
130. Id. at 74-85.
131. Generally, auditors gather a variety of evidence to verify corporate financial
statements, including:
1. physical evidence, e.g., inspection of property, inventory and assets;
2. documents provided by corporation or by others outside the corporation;
3. the underlying accounting records;
4. evidence from analytical procedures;
5. evidence from computations;
6. evidence provided by specialists;
7. oral evidence, e.g., discussions with corporate managers; and
8. evidence from client representation letters.
RAY WHITTINGTON & KURT PANY, PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING 125-26 (11 th ed. 1995).
132. Id. at 40.
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as a paid check or invoice. 33 The auditor may also review documents
that the corporation received from other entities, such as bank statements
and stock and bond certificates. 34 Such data are available to the auditor
throughout the audit, and prior to the corporation's release of the
financial statements to the public.
C. Access to Corporate Management
Another reason why investor-hired auditors, under the current
system, may not be able to do much in auditing or otherwise analyzing
corporate financial statements is that the accountants will not have the
same level of access to corporate management to ask questions or
otherwise discuss relevant financial issues.
1. Company-Hired Auditor's Access to Management
A company-hired auditor typically has frequent discussions with
corporate managers. For instance, just to plan an audit and in order to
have an understanding of the corporation's business and operations, the
auditor would usually have discussions with key corporate officers about
the corporation's "history, size, operations, accounting records, and
internal controls.""' Throughout an audit, the auditor usually poses
many questions to the corporation's officers and employees, such as
questions regarding the "location of records and documents, reasons
underlying an unusual accounting procedure", or determination as to
whether an account receivable is collectible. 3 6 Such discussions with
corporate management and employees make it more likely for auditors
to have a better understanding of and make better judgments regarding
the financial data they review.
2. The Public's Access to Management: The Effect of Regulation FD
Compared to a public company's outside auditors, the public has
much less access to question management about a company's financial
133. Id. at 129.
134. Id. at 128.
135. Id. at 150.
136. Id. at 132.
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condition. Regulation FD 3 7 is designed to provide the public with fair
access to management, but it is not clear whether the regulation
improves the quality or quantity of information the public may obtain
from management. ' Thus, it is likely that without additional
requirements, there will continue to be a gap between the public's and
company-hired auditors' access to management.
Regulation FD is meant to provide the public and analysts with
equal access to information provided by management. 39  Generally,
managers and executives of a public company are not legally required to
respond to questions from the public or to otherwise discuss the
company's financial condition. Nevertheless, corporate management
often chooses to have discussions with analysts who provide
recommendations regarding the company's stock. 140  During such
discussions, management often answers questions regarding the
company's financial performance.' 41  Corporate managers previously
were not legally required to share the same information with the
public. 42 On August 15, 2000, the SEC adopted Regulation FD in an
attempt to curb selective disclosure of material nonpublic information by
issuers to analysts and institutional investors. 43  The regulation
specifically requires that when an issuer discloses material information,
e.g., to analysts, it must also disclose the same information to the
public. 1
44
137. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-04 (2003).
138. See Laura S. Unger, Special Study: Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited (Dec.
2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm (last visited Dec.
18, 2003) (examining the effectiveness of Regulation FD at its one-year mark, taking
into account the concerns of parties affected by Regulation FD and making
recommendations to increase the Regulation's effectiveness).
139. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a).
140. See Proposed Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259, IC-24209 (Dec. 20, 1999), 1999 SEC LEXIS 2696, at
8 n.1 I (citing examples of selective disclosure reported on by the media).
141. Id. at 8 ("Commonly, these situations involve advance notice of the issuer's
quarterly earnings or sales figures.").
142. Id. (describing the habit of selective disclosure and its potential negative impact
on market integrity as the main reason for the proposed Regulation FD).
143. Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release
no. 33-7881, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (subsequently codified at 17 C.F.R.
§§ 243.100-03).
144. Id.
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The effects of Regulation FD on voluntary corporate disclosure are
unclear. According to a December 2001 special study by then SEC
Commissioner Laura Unger, there is a potential that, in order to avoid
violating Regulation FD, public companies may reduce the quantity of
information they disclose. 145 For instance, although experiences varied,
some participants in the study indicated that public companies have used
Regulation FD as a "shield" to justify refusal to provide disclosure to
analysts. 4 6 Others have noted that Regulation FD resulted in more
"boilerplate" disclosure and more release of "useless" information,
resulting in fewer questions being asked by analysts and answered by
management. 47 On the other hand, another study on the effect of
Regulation FD found no evidence that the regulation impaired the
quality and quantity of investor information from public companies.
48
In fact, the study found an increase in the frequency of voluntary
corporate disclosure.
149
Under the current environment, if an institutional investor or others
retain a financial professional to audit or review a company's financial
data, that professional's work may be materially hampered by simple
broad-based refusals by corporate management to answer questions or
otherwise provide explanations regarding specific accounting decisions
and issues. Although unclear, it is possible that corporate managers may
refuse to answer questions from such a professional to avoid violating
Regulation FD, or use the regulation as an excuse not to respond to
questions.
VII. MAKING IT FEASIBLE FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND OTHERS
TO HIRE THEIR OWN AUDITORS: MANDATING PUBLIC ACCESS TO
CORPORATE FINANCIAL DATA AND TO CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
Imagine the following scenario:
It is two days before the end of the first quarter of a closely followed
Fortune 500 corporation. Earlier, the CEO of this corporation
145. Unger, supra note 138, at III.B.I.
146. Id. at II.C.
147. Id. at III.B.2.
148. Frank Heflin et al., Regulation FD and the Financial Information: Early
Evidence, 78 ACCT. REV. 1, 4 (Jan. 2003).
149. Id.
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announced in a press conference that the company is on track to
exceed analysts' first quarter earnings forecasts. Meanwhile, the
controller of the corporation enters a fictitious sale of $30 million
worth of the corporation's products as an accounts receivable journal
entry in the company's computer, when, in fact, no such sale has
taken place. At the same time, in another location, a financial
professional hired by a mutual fund sees the same journal entry by
reviewing the corporation's general accounts journal on the
corporation's web site. Clicking through earlier journal entries, he
notices that a large amount of the corporation's sales for the first
quarter took place during the last weeks of the quarter. He also
notices that a large number of accounts receivable that were entered
at the end of previous quarters remain uncollected. The financial
professional smells a rat. He realizes that he has just identified tell-
tale signs that a corporation may be engaging in improper revenue
recognition, e.g., booking non-existent sales artificially to boost
earnings to meet analysts' expectations. He contacts, through the
Internet, the corporation's management for an explanation and found
the response to be evasive. As a result, he contacts the portfolio
manager of the mutual fund who decides against purchasing the
shares of the corporation. Others in the public observe on the
Internet the financial professional's question and the company's
response and reacted accordingly.
The above scenario cannot occur today because, as discussed
earlier, the public has limited access to a corporation's raw financial data
or to its management. Internet technology, however, now makes it
possible for the public to have real-time access to a public corporation's
internal financial records, if the corporation maintains the data in
electronic form on the Internet. Internet technology also makes it
possible for investor-hired auditors to have transparent and immediate
questioning and discussion of such financial data with corporate
management.
This Article proposes that public corporations be required to
maintain their financial records on a real time basis on web sites
accessible to the general public. The public, like corporate managers,
will then be able to find out about relevant financial events, such as sales
to customers or purchases from suppliers, as these events are recorded
on the company's books that are maintained on its web site. The
corporation's bank and securities account data will also be available on
the Internet.
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The idea of putting a company's raw financial data on the Internet
for public review is not new. Andy Kessler, a former hedge-fund
manager, is a proponent of requiring companies to maintain their books
on the Internet and he argues that the technology is available to do so.
As he commented in a Wall Street Journal Op-Ed:
The technology is already out there. PeopleSoft and Siebel and
Oracle make a killing-or so they say-selling an alphabet soup of
software: CRM (Customer Relationship Management), ERP
(Engineering and Resource Planning), and SCM (Supply Chain
Management) software. A CEO can track how the company is doing
on a day-by-day, heck minute-by-minute basis ....
Give me the password, and let me watch your numbers in real time.
Sure it's too much information, but I want it, I crave it .... Like
sushi, I like my numbers raw, and with them, I get a virtual seat on
the board. My vote is binding via buy and sell orders.
150
Just having the raw numbers, however, is not enough to provide the
public and investor-hired auditors the ability to audit or review a
company's financial data. An integral part of an auditor's job is to be
able to question management to better understand the data and the
accounting method used by management. This Article also proposes
that corporate management be required to respond, within defined
parameters, to questions from investors or investor-hired auditors
regarding a company's financial data. Rather than relying on private
initiatives to effectuate this plan, this Article proposes that the
government, particularly the Securities and Exchange Commission, take
the leading role in promulgating the reform.
Requiring a corporation to maintain its books and to respond to
questions on the Internet will break corporate management's monopoly
over corporate financial data. The financial statements will continue to
be an important source of information for the public to evaluate a
corporation's financial health. With greater access to a corporation's
financial data and to its management, however, the public, such as
institutional investors, will be able to hire their own auditors to audit or
otherwise evaluate objectively the accuracy of the financial statements.
150. Andy Kessler, Editorial, Show Me the Books, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at A-
10.
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In such an environment, it will be difficult for corporate managers to
engage in improper earnings management.
In particular, such access may unleash the full power and resources
of the market to ensure that corporate financial information is accurate.
By providing parties outside of the corporation access to corporate
financial information, accountants, analysts and other financial experts
will all compete in the market place to obtain the most accurate
corporate financial picture for institutional investors. The same market
forces will fuel innovation in accounting and analytical techniques, or
innovation in technology, such as audit software. Instead of one
company-hired audit firm auditing a corporation's financial statement in
accordance with GAAS, the proposal may result in numerous experts
using a variety of methods and tools to ascertain the accuracy of the
corporation's financial condition.
There are obvious drawbacks to this proposal. Companies will
incur costs in setting up the accounting system on the Internet and in
defending litigation that will inevitably accompany any corporate
disclosures. A company may lose its competitive advantage if it
discloses confidential business information as a result of detailed
disclosure of financial data. However, the potential benefits outweigh
these possible drawbacks. In any event, proper legislation or rulemaking
may be able to address some of these concerns.
A. It is Feasible to Maintain and Display a Company's Raw Financial
Data on the Internet
The technology is available for companies feasibly to maintain their
financial books and records on the Internet on a real-time basis. Most
companies today have computerized their bookkeeping systems so that
they no longer have actual ledger books. 5 The challenge is thus to
make the financial data that are stored in a company's internal
information system available on the Internet. There are number of ways
this process can feasibly take place based on existing technology. First,
there is a variety of software and technologies that specialize in linking
internal information systems to the Internet. In addition, instead of
storing these electronic data in a company's internal computer system, a
company can store the same data in an Internet server. For instance, one
151. Finkler, supra note 127, at 73.
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service provider offers Internet accounting to businesses by storing
electronic data at the company's server. Any authorized user can access
the accounting system through the service provider's website. The
service can limit certain persons' access to specific functions.
Presumably, it can thus limit some users to reviewing while allowing
other users to input or revise data in the accounting system.'52
In addition to the available technology, many public corporations
have already been developing innovative ways to convey to the public
corporate information through the Internet. The proposal will thus be a
natural extension of the current corporate trend. Several years ago, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) published a report
regarding how corporations are using the Internet to distribute business
information to the public.'53 According to the report, 84 percent of
public companies in the United States had web sites in 1996.11 At the
time of the report, 99 of the Fortune 100 companies had web sites of
which 93 included some form of financial web pages.'55 Generally,
these web sites provide financial information that will otherwise be
available on paper, such as annual reports and SEC filings. 5 6 Some of
the web sites, however, involved more innovative presentation of
financial information. For instance, some corporate web sites provide
video conference calls with and management presentations to analysts. 15 7
Some of the web sites provide for easy analysis of the financial
information they supply. For instance, some of the corporate websites
allow for financial information to be downloaded.' Some even provide
for downloadable spreadsheets. "9 While these innovations make more
accessible to the public information that will otherwise be in paper form,
none of the corporate web sites allows for access to the raw financial
data of the company.16
0
152. See, e.g., http://www.sl-software.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2003).
153. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Business Reporting Research Project,
Electronic Distribution of Business Reporting Information (2000) [hereinafter FASB
Report].
154. Id. at 7.
155. Id. at 18.
156. Id. at 11.
157. Id. at 12, 41-42.
158. Id. at 12.
159. Id. at 41-42.
160. Id. at 45.
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B. Requiring Public Access to Corporate Raw Financial Data and
Public Inquiries of Management on the Internet Will Provide Investor-
Hired Auditors with Effective Tools to Audit and Review Corporate
Financial Data
This Article proposes that the federal securities laws be amended to
require public companies to maintain their financial data, including their
general journals and ledgers in electronic form on the Internet. It will
also require that companies provide the public with Internet access to
information regarding their bank and securities brokerage accounts. To
the extent a public company has any subsidiaries, divisions or affiliates,
the proposal will require these entities to maintain their general journals
and ledgers and monthly financial statements on the Internet. Thus, the
public will be able to see every financial event that occurs and also see
how the events affect the accounts in the general ledger. For instance,
the public will be able to observe a sale by the company in the general
journal and also observe the corresponding increase in the accounts
receivable account and the corresponding decrease in the inventory
account maintained in the company's general ledger.
The company must maintain these financial data on a real-time
basis. For instance, an accounting clerk in a division of a public
company will make a general entry of a sale directly into the company's
Internet general journal. Thus, the public can see that entry on the
Internet as it is being made and, at the same time, observe the
corresponding changes in the various accounts in the company's general
ledger. In short, the proposal will allow the public to look into a
company's financial data the same way a corporate manager could.
The proposal also requires that corporations respond to reasonable
inquiries on the Internet regarding its financial records and that such
questions and answers should be posted on the corporations' websites.
As a result, the corporate responses, and the quality of the responses,
will provide further public insight regarding a company's financial
condition.
As long as an auditor has access to the underlying computerized
financial data of a company, he or she can perform a meaningful audit or
review. Many accounting firms have already taken advantage of the fact
that corporations maintain their financial records in computerized form.
For instance, many large accounting firms have developed generalized
audit software to audit the computer financial data of a company by
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conducting independent processing and analysis of the "live data."'
16
Thus auditors can use the software to rearrange the computerized data
into a format that is more useful to the auditors. 62 Using such software
to audit computerized financial data also makes it possible for the
auditor to expand greatly the size of the sample transactions to be
tested.1
63
Significantly, an investor-hired auditor with access to a company's
electronic data on a real-time basis will have the incentive to develop
innovative software or procedures to determine the accuracy of a
company's financial statements. GAAS, of course, do not require the
company-hired auditor to develop innovative software or procedures
even when innovations are possible. As a result, there is little incentive
for a company-hired auditor to do so. For instance, if a company-hired
auditor applies aggressive forensic detection software to audit a
company, applications that are not required by GAAS, management may
object to the cost of such "unnecessary" procedures and take offense by
viewing the fraud-detecting procedures to reflect the auditor's negative
view of management integrity. Freed from such constraints, an investor-
hired auditor may develop software that is designed to analyze the
corporate financial data continuously and identify and detect patterns or
red flags of possible financial misstatements. The securities industry
already has a history of developing and applying such software to detect
possible employee misconduct. For instance, a broker-dealer's
compliance department often has "exception" reports to identify
suspicious trading activities. Applying the same genre of software, an
investor-hired auditor may be able to create periodic exception reports to
identify types of financial misstatements. One form of financial fraud is
improper revenue recognition, including using fictitious sales to boost
revenue. Since a sale is fictitious, the account receivable for that sale
will typically not be paid. An investor-hired auditor can create a
computer exception report to identify unusual patterns of uncollected
receivables to detect possible improper revenue recognition.'64
161. Whittington & Pany, supra note 131, at 255.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. For instance, computer software already exists to reorganize account receivable
files into the format of an aged trial balance. Id. at 257.
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By having real-time access to the journal entries, an investor-hired
auditor will be able to determine whether a company's financial
statements reconcile with the underlying journal entries or whether
entries have been changed. It will thus be difficult for senior managers
to adjust improperly entries after the fact, or to falsify the ledgers, i.e.,
the summary of the entries.
Further, by having real-time access to the company's bank and
brokerage account records, an investor-hired auditor will be able to
identify any large or unusual cash or securities transaction. It will thus
be difficult for managers to embezzle from the company or otherwise
misappropriate corporate assets. It will also allow investor-hired
auditors to identify any discrepancy between a company's
cash/securities holdings with financial data in its ledgers.
The ability of investor-hired auditors to question management will
allow management to explain or clarify questionable accounting
practices or entries, and to avoid false alarms. At the same time,
management's inability to justify questionable accounting practices, or
its evasiveness in doing so, will likely confirm the auditors' concerns or
suspicions. Because the questions and answers will be posted on the
company's website, one investor-hired auditor's suspicion or concern
will be quickly disseminated throughout the market. Management, if it
has a good answer, will thus have a strong incentive to be as responsive
as possible to avoid negative market impact.
Under such vigorous public scrutiny, the company-hired outside
auditor will have a better incentive and opportunity to perform its audit
in a thorough manner. Knowing that the interested parties have the
ability to review the underlying financial data of a company, an auditor
will have the incentive to discover problems before others do. In
addition, public scrutiny or questions of certain entries may alert the
company's auditor to review the same entries. Importantly, the same
questions and responses, because they will be posted on corporate
websites, will quickly alert the public to the questionable practices or
entries.
Providing the public with access to a company's underlying
financial data and to its management will not absolutely prevent
motivated wrongdoers from perpetrating schemes to mislead the public
about a company's financial status. Making such financial data
available to the public, however, will effectively increase greatly the sets
of eyes that will be reviewing a company's financials. More parties
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reviewing financials will increase the chance of detecting fraudulent and
improper accounting.
Providing greater access to corporate financial information will
result in a number of benefits that are associated with a transparent
market. For instance, it will lead to a more efficient and better-informed
market. In turn, better investment decisions will promote a more
efficient market and more accurate allocation of investment capital to
companies that are doing well as opposed to companies that are doing
poorly.165  By providing a more up-to-date picture of a company's
financial condition, the market may also become less volatile. The more
information investors possess about a company prior to earnings
announcement, the less change there will be to the company's stock
price after earnings announcements. 166 The proposal will provide the
market, including analysts, with more precise information regarding a
company's financial status, which will likely result in more accurate
predictions by analysts of a corporation's earnings. 167 When analysts'
165. There are various theories regarding how to determine the value of a company.
For instance, the fundamental analysis approach assumes that a company has an
intrinsic value and that value can be determined by an analysis of relevant data. The
Efficient Capital Market Theory (semi-strong) assumes that a company's stock price
reflects all available facts relevant to a company and thus the stock price fairly reflects
the value of the company. Under either approach, greater access to up-to-date
information will result in more efficient allocation of capital to performing companies.
166. In their study regarding the effect of Regulation FD, Heflin et al. attempted to
determine whether Regulation FD promoted more or less information prior to earnings
announcements by studying price variation after announcements, based on the theory
that the more information prior to earnings announcements, the less price volatility after
earnings announcements. Heflin et al., supra note 148, at 5-17. They concluded that
Regulation FD resulted in a smaller gap between stock prices prior to earnings
announcement and stock prices after announcement and that Regulation FD provided
the market with more information prior to earnings announcement. Id. at 17. These
results suggest that increased information flow will decrease market volatility by
narrowing price gaps.
167. Instead of describing stock price swings as a reaction to corporate management
not meeting such earnings expectations, it may be more accurate to describe the stock
price swing as a reaction to analysts' earnings forecasts being inaccurate. Because a
stock analyst does not have up-to-date and detailed financial data that is maintained
internally, their predictions or expectations of a company's earnings do not always
match the actual earnings the company announces quarterly and annually. The wild
swings result from the market adjusting from its prior inaccurate expectation to the
earnings announcement.
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expectations match with actual earnings results, it is less likely that there
will be wild swings of stock price during the release of the quarterly and
annual financial statements. To a certain degree, it may even reduce the
pressure for corporate management to manage earnings improperly to
match with incorrect analysts' expectations.
C. Relaxing Independence Rules on Company-Hired Outside Auditors
If investors and others can effectively hire their own accounting and
financial professionals to audit or analyze corporate financial data, there
will be less of a need to enforce the supposed independence of company-
hired outside auditors. To the extent a company's outside auditor does
not adequately perform an audit because of lack of independence, or for
any other reasons, investor-hired auditors will likely spot the
deficiencies.
Under this scenario, Congress and the SEC should amend the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and accompanying SEC rules to relax restrictions
against consulting services provided by a company's auditor. Since the
system proposed by this Article does not rely on the independence of
company-hired auditors, it will make sense to allow companies to enjoy
the full benefits of consulting services provided by their own auditors
who are intimately familiar with the companies' business and culture.
D. The Government, Particularly the SEC, Should Take a Leading Role
in Setting Regulations For Internet Access to Corporate Financial Data
and Corporate Management.
Government involvement is necessary to effectuate Internet access
to corporate financial data and to corporate management. The
management of a public corporation has very little incentive to disclose
voluntarily its raw financial data on the Internet on a real-time basis, i.e.,
to give up its monopoly of financial data. In particular, it will lose a
great deal of its power to shape and summarize financial information to
the public, in the form of press announcements and financial statements.
Disclosing its raw financial data on a real-time basis will subject
management to greater and more frequent public scrutiny of the
financial condition of the corporation.
The SEC already has a successful experience leading the private
sector to adopt technological changes in disclosing corporate financial
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data, as the SEC has done in promoting the EDGAR system. The SEC's
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system
enables corporations to file electronically documents required to be filed
under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the Public Utility Act, the
Trust Indenture Act, and the Investment Company Act. The SEC, in
turn, disseminates EDGAR filings electronically. Currently, all public
companies, absent an exemption, are required to file through EDGAR
and these filings are available electronically and displayed on the SEC
web sit at http://www.sec.gov/index.htm.
The SEC took a two-step approach in prodding public corporations
to file through EDGAR. It first provided companies with the
opportunity to file through EDGAR on a voluntary basis, to experiment
with the filing and to become adjusted to doing so. At a certain point,
after public companies and the SEC identified and resolved problems
associated with EDGAR filings, it issued rules requiring that all
corporations file through EDGAR. In 1984, the SEC began the
voluntary phase by allowing corporations voluntarily to file through
EDGAR. 16' After approximately 12 years of experimentation and
changes, the SEC in 1996 required all corporations to file through
EDGAR. 169 The SEC continues to use this two-step approach in its
efforts to modernize EDGAR. In 1999, the SEC adopted rules to
modernize the EDGAR system in light of the emergence of the Internet.
For instance, in June 1999, it began allowing filers to submit, on a
voluntary basis, documents to EDGAR in HyperText Markup Language
(HTML) format and to accompany their required filings with unofficial
copies in Portable Document Format (PDF).17° By February 2000, the
SEC had already began preparing public corporations for the likelihood
that they would be required to file documents in HTML format and
encouraged corporations to "gain experience" using the format in the
meantime.' 7' The SEC may thus be able to use the same two-step
168. Proposed Rule: Rulemaking for EDGAR System, Release Nos. 33-7803; 34-
42462; 35-27142; 39-2382; IC-24319, at I.A. (Feb. 25, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-42462.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2003).
169. Id.
170. Rulemaking for EDGAR System, Release Nos. 33-7684; 34-41410; IC-23843
[64 FR 27888] (May 17, 1999) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7684.txt
(last visited Nov. 25, 2003).
171. Rulemaking for EDGAR System, 65 Fed, Reg, 11,507, 11,509 (proposed
March 3, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 250,
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approach, i.e., voluntary experimentation followed by requirement, in
pushing public corporations to disclose its financial data on the Internet
on a real-time basis.
The SEC may also be the natural choice for leading the initiative
toward real-time corporate disclosure of raw financial data on the
Internet because such an initiative will complement existing efforts by
the SEC to improve the quality and timeliness of a corporation's
financial disclosure. For instance, in September 2002, the SEC
implemented a rule to accelerate the filing of quarterly reports and
annual reports by certain public corporations. 172 At the same time the
SEC also proposed a rule requiring such corporations to disclose in their
annual reports, among other things, whether they make available free of
charge on their Internet websites, if they have websites, their 10-Ks, 10-
Qs and 8-K filings. 73 If one of these corporations does not disclose the
specific filings on its website, the rule requires the corporation to
disclose the reasons why it does not do so including, if applicable, that it
does not have a website.
74
The policy bases behind these rules should similarly justify the SEC
taking the initiative to push companies to disclose their underlying
financial data on a real-time basis on the Internet. First, the SEC has
implemented a rule to accelerate corporate filings because of concerns
259, 260, 269, 270, and 274) ("We have not and are not now proposing to require the
use of HTML for filings. However, we expect to require HTML for most filings in the
future, so we encourage filers to use it and gain experience with this format if they do
not have it already.").
172. Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning
Website Access to Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 33,8128, 67 Fed. Reg. 58,480
(Sept. 16, 2002) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 240 and 249) [hereinafter Rule on
Acceleration of Periodic Reports]. Specifically, the rule accelerates the filing of
quarterly reports and annual reports as required by the Exchange Act by domestic
reporting companies that have a public float of at least $75 million, that have been
subject to the Exchange Act reporting requirements for at least 12 calendar months, and
that previously have filed at least one annual report. Id. The rule shortens the filing
deadlines from 45 to 30 calendar days after period end for quarterly reports and from 90
to 60 calendar days after fiscal year end for annual reports. Id. The rule also provide for
a 3-year transition period for companies to phase in compliance. Id.
173. Id. at 58,481, 58,492.
174. Id. at 58,492 (requiring the disclosure of whether Internet access is available
follows the SEC's time-tested method of using initial encouragement, rather than
immediate requirement, in pushing corporations toward adopting technologically new
methods of disclosure).
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that, by the time the filings are available to the public, these filings are
already "stale."' 5  Second, the SEC implemented the disclosure rule
regarding Internet access to corporate filings because it believes that, in
light of technological developments involving the Internet, providing
information on a corporation's Internet website is an efficient and
economical method to make corporate information available to many
investors.
76
Modernizing the disclosure system under the federal securities laws
involves recognizing the importance of the Internet in fostering
prompt and more widespread dissemination of information. [citation
omitted] We believe company disclosure should be more readily
available to investors on a timely basis in a variety of locations to
facilitate investor access to that information. We believe it is
important for companies to make investors aware of the different
sources that provide access to company information. We applaud
those that already provide access to their Commission filings through
their websites, and encourage every reporting company to do so.
Based on these same reasons, an initiative for a corporation to
provide its underlying financial data on a real-time basis should be the
next logical step.
The SEC will also be suited to requiring management to respond to
reasonable inquiries regarding its financial condition. In particular, such
duties will resemble the SEC's current role in administering proxy rules.
For example, the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance processes
hundreds of no-action requests based on Rule 14a-8 from public
companies that do not wish to place certain proposals from
175. It is further noted that:
We believe that periodic reports contain valuable information for investors.
Commentators have long remarked, however, that because due dates for periodic
reports are so lengthy, the information included in the reports often is stale by the time
the reports are filed. (citation omitted) While quarterly and annual reports at present
generally reflect historical information, it is important that a lengthy delay before that
information becomes available does not make the information less valuable to
investors.
Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning Website
Access to Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,896, 19,897 (proposed Apr. 23, 2002) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. 229, 240, and 249) [hereinafter Proposed Rule on Acceleration of
Periodic Reports].
176. Id. at 19,903.
177. See Rule on Acceleration of Periodic Reports, supra note 172, at 58,492.
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shareholders. 7 8 Rule 14a-8 allows a public company to exclude a
shareholder proposal based on one of 13 specified reasons. 179  For
instance, a company may exclude a shareholder proposal that duplicates
a proposal submitted by another shareholder that will be included in the
company's proxy materials for the same meeting. 80 It also establishes
specific deadlines for the shareholder proposal process.' 81 When it
receives a no-action request, the Division of Corporation Finance
analyzes each of the bases for exclusion that a company asserts, along
with arguments that the shareholder sets forth, and determines whether it
concurs with the company's decision to exclude.
8 2
Similarly, this Article proposes that the SEC implement rules to
ensure that management is not overwhelmed by questions and that the
process is not abused by frivolous or overly burdensome inquiries. For
instance, the SEC may implement rules to limit the time period, perhaps
to several days each quarter, when the public may pose questions on the
Internet to avoid excessively occupying time and resources of
management. The rules may also limit the number of questions posed
by each person or entity. The rules may also provide for management
not to answer questions that were already answered, questions that are
not relevant to the company's financial data or questions that involve
trade secrets. The SEC may review the management's refusal to
respond in a manner that is similar to its no-action process for proxy
rules. Another alternative is for the SEC to set up a process where
questioners will have the right to petition the SEC to compel responses if
refusals to respond are not justified, similar to a motion to compel in the
discovery process under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures.
178. SEC Division of Corporate Finance, Shareholder Proposals, Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 14 (July 13, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslbl4.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
179. Id. at § B.1.
180. Id..
181. Id. at § B.3.
182. Id. at §§ B.5, and B.6.
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E. Litigation Risk, Confidentiality and Cost
1. Increased Litization Risk
One danger to providing raw financial data on a real-time basis on
the Internet is that inaccurate data will be provided to the investing
public, since the company will have had few opportunities to review the
data for accuracy. If the scope of the inaccuracies is material, the
company may be subject to civil litigation and regulatory sanctions for
disclosing inaccurate information to the public.
Providing a legislative safe harbor from such litigation and
regulatory action should alleviate the litigation risk. 8 3 However, such a
safe harbor will increase the risk that unscrupulous managers will take
advantage of the safe harbor and purposely disseminate false data to
increase the company's stock price. Thus the safe harbor should not
apply if the inaccurate data is a result of intentional or reckless conduct.
Further, the safe harbor should not be available if a plaintiff can show
that the company had inadequate internal control, thus creating
additional incentives for company to maintain internal control which, in
turn, may reduce the risk of disclosing inaccurate data as a result of
mistakes.
In addition, a company should be required to correct any
inaccuracies in the raw data as soon as such inaccuracies are discovered.
Such a requirement will alleviate any harm that may result from
disclosing inaccurate data. To a certain extent, how frequent a company
makes corrections also provides the opportunity for the investing public
to assess a company's internal control with respect to its financial data.
2. Disclosing Confidential Information
Another concern with disclosing raw financial data on the Internet
is that a company may be forced to divulge otherwise confidential
information that will jeopardize its competitive advantage. For instance,
businesses are often protective of information regarding their customers,
183. Such a safe harbor provision would be similar to Section 21E of the Exchange
Act, supra note 125, which provides a safe harbor from private actions for forward-
looking statements under specified conditions, such as lack of materiality or actual
knowledge as related to misstatements or omissions.
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including their identities. If the information is disclosed, competitors
may take advantage of the information and "poach" the customers.
Companies often include customer information in their journal entries
and thus a requirement to disclose journal entries will disclose otherwise
confidential customer information. In addition, disclosure of raw
financial data, such as journal entries, may disclose information that a
customer will consider confidential. For instance, information regarding
components a manufacturing customer purchases may disclose trade
secrets regarding the customer's manufacturing process.
This concern, however, may not be as troubling for several reasons.
First, regardless of whether there is Internet access to a company's
financial data, most state corporate laws allow for shareholders to
examine the books and records of a company. 8 4 Second, the SEC can
certainly implement rules to provide for companies, when well justified,
to withhold customer identities, e.g., by replacing names with codes, or
other sensitive information, while still disclosing the underlying
financial information.
3. Cost
Another possible objection to the proposal is that of costs.
Particularly in the beginning, companies will incur cost in setting up the
necessary structure to provide Internet access to its financial data. In
addition, companies will incur cost in the form of additional personnel to
process and respond to questions from the public regarding its financial
data.
Balanced against such costs, however, are the benefits of a more
transparent market. Considering the decline in both market
capitalization and investor confidence that resulted from the recent
financial scandals, one can reasonably argue that such costs are well
justified, particularly over the long term.
184. See Catherine Reese, Avoiding the Next Enron, FORTUNE, Apr. 15, 2002, at 358
(explaining shareholders' access to the company can range from board meetings'
minutes to internal company emails). A shareholder must first determine the place of
the company's incorporation and then send a letter to the company's headquarters
requesting specific records and reason for request. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Company-hired, yet supposedly independent, outside auditors failed
to detect and prevent the massive and blatant corporate financial
scandals that have recently rocked the U.S. securities markets. There are
strong indications that misaligned financial incentives caused many of
these audit failures. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's approach of creating
additional restrictions on consulting fees may improve the quality of
audits. However, this restrictive regulatory approach will continue to
face an uphill battle, because it is difficult to force auditors to go against
their very powerful and subconscious financial instincts, i.e., to be
vigilant over their own employers.
Instead, Congress and the SEC should fashion laws to align the
interest of auditors with those who have the greatest interest in accurate
financial reporting, the investing public. Advances in Internet
technology now make it feasible for investor-hired auditors to perform
meaningful audits or reviews of corporate financial data. Congress and
the SEC should implement laws and regulations that will provide the
public access to such data and to management through the Internet, in
order to create an environment that will foster the emergence of
investor-hired auditors. Regulations should also be directed toward
ameliorating any negative effects associated with such increased access,
including regulations designed to reduce litigation risks. The market
will take care of the rest.
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